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Abstract 
 
This work analyzes the autobiographical narrative of a member of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) 
from a cognitive standpoint in order to show how the language of the seminal AA text, Alcoholics 
Anonymous, creates meaning and shapes perception for its members. By tracking the presence of a major 
metaphor and its extensions from the text that guides the narrative of the individual AA member, we can 
see how members are able to assume ownership of the AA ideology, thereby using it to create their 
personal AA stories and their overall identities as recovering alcoholics. The data from the metaphors in 
the autobiography are examined using cognitive or cultural models of understanding language that have 
been passed down by established members of the discourse community (Stockwell, 2002). These cognitive 
models are then put into the framework of conceptual blending theory to show how the metaphors guide 
perception (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). 
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1  The Relationship between Text and Reader 
 
Using Norman Holland’s (2002) proposition that what we know about a text is only our 
conception of that text, I am analyzing the relationship between members of Alcoholics 
Anonymous (AA) and AA’s primary text, Alcoholics Anonymous (2001). The sections 
that follow are focused on some of the metaphors from the AA text, and how those 
metaphors create meaning and shape perception for members of the AA program. By 
tape recording and transcribing the 60-minute AA autobiography of Michelle C., an AA 
member who had been sober in the AA program for about 19 months at the time of the 
interview, I track the metaphors that Michelle has taken from the AA text and used in 
her personal narrative. Then I explore how she uses those metaphors to interpret 
meaning in her life presently as well as how she applies them to make sense of her life 
before she came to AA.  
In order to examine this use of metaphorical language, I begin by discussing 
theories of how we categorize information in our minds and the role that language and 
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culture play in that categorization. I then move from theories of language in general to 
those of metaphorical language, specifically. My goal is to apply these theories to 
Michelle’s story by following the language she uses to show her adoption of the AA 
ideology and to demonstrate the influence that the new ideology has on her complete 
worldview. This influence becomes obvious as Michelle’s conception of the AA text 
changes once she starts practicing AA’s shared system of ideas and codes for behavior 
on a regular basis in her own life.  
While this individualized process of textual interpretation might seem obvious 
when we put it on paper, it does put a damper on some traditional theories of how 
language works. As Holland (2002) points out, our critical minds resist accounting for 
the variability in meaning that is required by a cognitively-informed approach to the 
act of reading. He shows the reasons for this almost unconscious resistance in his 
discussion of some of the traditional theories of language, like “folk theory” in which 
words are thought of as containers of fixed meanings (Holland 2002:24). Put another 
way, folk theory depicts a figurative system, where words are external packages that 
contain the things they represent. One problem, or illusion, here is in our belief that the 
things that our words represent have a finite semantic content that is the same to all of 
us. Another problem underlying this finite semantic content is thinking that the 
content exists outside and independent of our minds. This illusion, however, makes 
sense when we look at its evolutionary purpose. It comes from our human survival 
mechanisms, which allow us to connect an object with our reactions to that object, or 
to join together cause and effect (Fauconnier and Turner 2002:76, Holland 2002). For 
instance, our minds instantly register a female black widow spider (red hourglass shape 
on its abdomen) with what we already know about its potential to poison us, so that 
our minds fuse our fear of the effects of the spider’s venom to the spider itself. While 
our ability to simultaneously fuse the external object with our experience of that object, 
whether an individual or a collective cultural experience, has served to keep us out of 
danger and to keep us fed for millions of years (Fauconnier and Turner 2002:76), that 
ability does create an illusion about perception. Here, what appears to us to be what we 
are receiving from our sensory perception of an object is actually our experience of that 
object. When that illusion is transferred to our understanding of language as it is in folk 
theory as described by Holland (2002) it obscures the true account of the interactive 
relationship between the reader and the text. Rather than simply receiving the same 
finite semantic content from a text as we read, we are instead actively constructing our 
own interpretation of the text by fusing the language in the text to the experience our 
minds connect to that language. This relationship can be clarified by examining how 
our minds process language and by isolating what we are and are not consciously 
aware of when we respond to our reading: 
In short, we can hardly escape inferring—no, faster than that, perceiving—text and response as 
cause and effect, even if doing so is inappropriate. Hence, having projected our inner sensations 
to form an idea of an object ‘out there,’ we then ‘explain’ our inner sensations as being ‘effects’ 
caused by that ‘object.’ We do this even though that very object is itself our projection from those 
sensations.  (Holland 2002:29, emphasis original)  
 
Holland’s description of our neurological merger of sensory input with our store 
of personal baggage gives rise to research questions that are more appropriate for 
interactive reading. Instead of asking “What is the underlying meaning of the content 
contained in the text?” the question shifts to the following: 1) “Why do different readers 
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have different responses to the same text?” and 2) “How can one reader have different 
responses to the same text at different times in her life?” 
 
 
2  The Relationship between the AA Text and the AA Member 
 
In Michelle’s story, the shortcomings of folk theory become evident in her account of 
her previous exposure to the AA text, AA talk, and AA ideology in general. In her 
story, she talks about how her exposure to the text has affected her differently at 
different times, both before and then after she became willing to admit that she was an 
alcoholic and to follow AA’s 12-step recovery program. By acknowledging her need to 
have a sponsor, i.e., an experienced AA member, show her how to “work the steps” 
(Michelle C. 2009:7) instead of simply reading the steps, Michelle is giving evidence of 
being able to glean different meanings (and, in this case, even different results) from the 
same text, as she explains here: 
You know, before, I would read those steps…It’s ideal that you get a sponsor, and you work the 
steps with a sponsor, somebody who knows what they’re doing. I’d wanted to work the steps so 
I would read them, and I thought I’d worked them. And then I would go and tell these people 
this stuff that I had done—that was supposed to be on my fourth step. There’s a process for that. 
We’ve got to do that in a process. We’ve got to do one before we can do two, and two before we 
can do three, and so on and so forth.   
 
The “fourth step” Michelle talks about above is a written moral inventory, which 
produces the first tangible artifact in the recovery process. Creating the fourth step 
requires the recovering alcoholic to list all fears and all resentments she has of people, 
places, and institutions. Next, following an explanation from the sponsor of the printed 
example in the AA text, she is to list whichever instincts these fears and resentments 
have aggravated in her (e.g., her self-esteem, her financial security, her ambitions, her 
personal relationships, or her sex relations) (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001:65). While the 
AA text does provide both a description of how to write a fourth step inventory and 
gives an actual example of one, the process can overwhelm understanding in 
newcomers because many have never seen the material before and they are often 
physically, mentally, and emotionally exhausted from chemical withdrawal when they 
arrive at AA.  
Michelle then addresses the need to have a sponsor show her how to “work” the 
steps in order. In talking about the necessity of having a guide, her emphasis is on the 
process of working the steps and the importance of that process in her AA recovery. 
Here are the first four of AA’s 12 steps, listed in order (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001:59): 
(1)   We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become unmanageable.  
(2) Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.  
(3) Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood 
Him. (emphasis original) 
(4) Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.  
 
Because the three steps that come before the written moral inventory do not 
require any specific writing and, therefore, do not yield any tangible products, they can 
be even more confusing than the fourth step inventory. The admission of powerlessness 
over alcohol, the recognition of unmanageability and insanity, the belief in a Higher 
Power, and the surrender of one’s will and life to that Higher Power are difficult and 
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complicated propositions. Not only that, working these first three steps requires much 
more action than is implied in the words used to depict them. The intense actions 
required in these proposals become clear in Michelle’s story when her relationship with 
the steps changes as a result of working with a sponsor. Again, her role here shifts from 
a passive, reading role to an active, working role as she is taught how to apply the 
proposals to her life.  
In the section of the AA text that introduces the 12 steps, “How it Works,” the 
wording plainly states that these proposals require action, “If you have decided that you 
want what we have and are willing to go to any length to get it—then you are ready to 
take certain steps” (2001:58). Instead of writing that the alcoholic needs to believe in 
certain ideas, the authors of the text use the terms “take certain steps,” i.e., each one of 
these proposals requires that the recovering alcoholic act on her new beliefs. So the 
acceptance of the first three proposals is evidenced in a new way of living, which a 
newcomer does by taking an active part in the AA fellowship and enacting the AA 
ideology. But the language in the text seems only to provide clues on how to take this 
action, and, for Michelle, it is not until her sponsor provides an interpretation of the 
language, as an experienced member of the AA community, that she is able to move 
forward.  
 
 
3  Discourse Communities Create New Meaning  
 
Sponsors and other experienced AA members, by sharing their communal 
understanding of the program with newcomers, are actually providing new members 
with novel ways to organize knowledge. In Stockwell’s (2002) work on discourse 
communities and cognition, he discusses how this kind of information sharing amongst 
members of a specific community (the discourse community) is defined by its members’ 
common uses and understandings of language and texts. The sponsors are providing 
the new members with new “cognitive models” (2002:33), which the newcomer then 
uses as a tool for interpreting the language of the community. Stockwell clarifies how 
our understandings of concepts reside in our cognitive models and not just in the words 
or codes we use to represent them: 
Cognitive models consist of relations between categories, set up socially, culturally, and on the 
basis of individual experience, as our means of understanding and negotiating the world and our 
lives through it.  (2002:33) 
 
 
These new cognitive models, supplied by the more experienced AA members, 
are pragmatic in nature because they are highly context dependent. How a concept is 
thought of in one discourse community could be quite different than how it is 
understood in another. The concept of God in the AA community, for example, is left to 
the individual to define. The fact that this definition is left to the individual is very 
much a shared understanding in the community because the program broadly calls for a 
“spiritual experience” (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001:27) to effect recovery. When 
compared to many Christian communities, for example, the AA God concept does not 
necessarily include the concept of Jesus Christ as deity: “Much to our relief, we 
discovered we did not need to consider another’s conception of God” (Alcoholics 
Anonymous 2001:46). But the AA concept does not exclude Christ, either: “When, 
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therefore, we speak to you of God, we mean your own conception of God.” Again, the 
text describes this concept of spirituality as a “willingness to believe in a Power greater 
than ourselves” (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001:46). 
Because these new cognitive models are shared by the AA discourse 
community, they can be understood as “cultural models” (Stockwell 2002:33). A group’s 
cultural models are both created and governed by that group’s norms. In Michelle’s 
case, her eventual adoption of AA’s cultural models becomes apparent when she begins 
the activity of working or taking the 12 steps according to the language in the text as 
interpreted by her sponsor. Michelle’s sponsor is teaching her how to be a member of 
the community as described in AA’s 12th step, which suggests that the alcoholic “carry 
the message to other alcoholics” and “practice” the principles of the 12 steps: “(12) 
Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this 
message to other alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs” 
(Alcoholics Anonymous 2001:60). 
 When Michelle commits to this process, she learns how to become a member of 
AA’s “community of practice” (Lave and Wenger 1991). Being a member of the 
community requires a commitment to the domain of shared interests and to practicing 
beliefs and activities that have been established through sharing and building 
knowledge together (Lave and Wenger 1991). Some of Michelle’s practices and her new 
understanding of the language come not only from working with her sponsor 
individually but also from a group of other AA members that she studies the AA text 
with. In the passage below, she refers to the text as the “Big Book” and describes how 
she was taught to read the text, first by her sponsor and then in a group setting of other 
AA members:  
So we went and we got in the Big Book. And we started from the front page, which has nothing 
on it, and she said, “That’s what you know about staying sober. You know nothing.” And I did; I 
knew nothing about staying sober. Because all my life, I was just living on my will, living on my 
instincts that told me it was ok to drink and do drugs to make myself feel better. Which is not 
ok. And not everybody does that. That’s not something that everybody does. The people I hung 
around with did. So we went and we read every single word. Page by page, word by word. And 
when we got to a step, we worked a step; when we got to a prayer, we prayed the prayer. We 
went through all pages, 1-164. We did it with a Big Book study, we did it with other women.  
(Michelle C. 2009:9) 
 
Once Michelle learns from the group how to understand the language in a new 
way, she can begin practicing the principles and the activities of the program in her 
own life.  
Based on the adoption of the community’s goals and purposes as one’s own 
(Lave and Wenger 1991), engaging in these practices over time fosters a new identity 
for the participant in relation to the community. The sense of identity is vital to the 
learning process in organizations (Wenger 1998) because it helps us know what to focus 
on, which actions to take, and which actions to avoid. For Michelle, this new identity 
emerges as she eventually develops a new understanding of her own position in the 
program and identifies herself as part of the larger AA culture. Her new place in the 
culture, in turn, allows her to become part of the AA cycle of teaching newcomers how 
to work the steps based on how she was taught by her sponsor and other experienced 
AA members. She describes her relationship with a woman she is sponsoring as a part 
of the AA cycle that comes from AA’s 12th step:  
I’ve been sponsoring her for about a year now, almost a year. I’m not keeping her sober. I 
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believe that the only thing I have to offer her or anybody else in this program is my experience 
with Alcoholics Anonymous. I take them though the steps; what they do with it is their 
business. But like with my sponsor, she took me through the steps. (Michelle C. 2009:9) 
 
The shift in identity is evident in the way Michelle identifies herself as a sponsor 
who has AA experience to offer the newcomer, as opposed to her view of herself when 
she had first come to AA and needed to rely on others’ experience to be able to 
understand the AA text and practices. 
 
 
4  From Folk Theory to Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
 
Even though the illusory nature of the folk theory is obvious in the AA discussion, the 
stubborn notion persists and so “the human systems responsible for nine-tenths of the 
work in communicating” (Reddy 1979:188) continue to be overlooked. Over 30 years 
ago, Michael Reddy (1979:188) pointed out the tendency to talk about language as if it 
were a container of ideas, thoughts, and feelings. Reddy’s account of this description, 
called “the conduit metaphor,”(1979:188) expands the folk theory that Holland (2002) 
writes about into a more comprehensive model which also includes the roles of the 
author and the audience. In the conduit metaphor, the author deposits her ideas into 
her words and then sends them off to the audience by either speaking or writing. The 
next step is for the audience simply to receive those words, which contain the author’s 
ideas. Thus, words are being used as a conduit by functioning as a vessel for channeling 
the author’s thoughts. 
Twenty years after Reddy’s (1979) article, researchers within the cognitive 
linguistic framework have furthered Reddy’s concept. In “The ‘Conduit Metaphor’ 
Revisited,” Joe Grady (1998) suggests that we are actually deriving our descriptions of 
language from much more general metaphors like “CONSTITUENTS ARE CONTENTS” 
(211) and “INFORMATION IS CONTENTS” (213). He cites the pervasiveness of these 
more generalized metaphors in areas outside of communication processes to make his 
point. Grady’s examples show these more generalized metaphors at work in a much 
larger cultural context, i.e. “The class is full of bright students” (211) and “There are 
seven days in a week” (211), to build a strong argument that these broad metaphors are 
the actual source for our descriptions of communication. These general metaphors then 
serve as the basis for folk theory metaphors like the following two examples:  
(1) This writer crams words into sentences which are desperately packed and crowded. 
(2) She packs a tremendous number of ideas into each carefully worded statement.   (Grady 
1998:211) 
 
Grady (1998) reiterates Reddy’s concerns: 1) using the conduit metaphor has a 
negative effect on the way we think about language and 2) use of the conduit metaphor 
tells us that we actually believe folk theory despite any evidence to the contrary. Once 
the metaphor is pointed out, we can easily see its shortcomings. The speaker/writer is 
not solely responsible for packaging finite semantic content and then sending that 
content to the reader/listener who passively receives it. Also, it is important to 
recognize how using these metaphors might shape perception and negatively influence 
our understanding of the communication process. If we want to be aware of how 
language actually works, we would need to first be aware that these metaphors are 
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persistent manifestations of our illusions about language. Locating the common thread 
between speaking and thinking, Reddy cites the Whorf hypothesis: 
The precise claim being made here is important. It has to do, I think, with one of the ways in 
which people commonly misunderstand the Whorf hypothesis. I do not claim that we cannot 
think momentarily in terms of another model of the communication process. I argue, rather, that 
that thinking will remain brief, isolated, and fragmentary in the face of an entrenched system of 
opposing attitudes and assumptions.  (1979:177)  
 
 The Whorf hypothesis, also known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, was 
proposed by Anthropologist and Linguist Edward Sapir, from his studies in Native 
American languages. The theory ultimately espouses the belief that the language we 
use affects the way understand and negotiate our realities (Whorf 1956). Sapir’s student, 
Benjamin Whorf continued Sapir’s work, condensing it into the principle of linguistic 
relativity, which states that different cultural concepts are represented through 
different languages (Whorf 1956). Thus, in theory, using different words to describe a 
concept can contribute to differing cognitive classifications and categorizations of 
information. In other words, the way we think about a concept is relative to the way 
our cultures represent that concept linguistically.  
Reddy’s argument, as stated above, is what makes his discussion of the conduit 
metaphor so important in any discussion about whether or not speech influences 
thought. If we use what we say to figure out what we think, then our expressions that 
so flagrantly show us reverting to the conduit metaphor to describe language all serve 
as little pieces of evidence that the way we speak does actually influence the way we 
think. Speaking in terms of the conduit metaphor then means thinking in terms of the 
conduit metaphor. If our expressions are reliable proof of our thoughts, then the results 
are staggeringly in favor of linguistic relativity. Regardless of our confirmed knowledge 
to the contrary, our reliance on folk theory to describe language is proof of some 
unrealistic expectations we have placed on language. And even though we know that 
trying to understand language as a representative system of finite realities is not 
sensible, we just cannot resist talking about words as if they mean the same things to 
all of us.   
Another way to find proof that words do not represent fixed meanings is to 
examine scenarios where a reader understands a text in a totally different way at 
different times in her life. Looking at Michelle’s case, we can see how her interpretation 
of the AA text varies significantly, based on her changing relationship with the material 
and the AA program. At this point, it is important to make a definite distinction 
between linguistic expressions and the semantic concepts they represent in order to 
analyze the phenomenon of Michelle’s different construals of the language in the text. 
Considering only the conceptual material (rather than the language) provides an 
explanation for the variable meaning. In their work on conceptual metaphor, George 
Lakoff and Mark Turner refer to the notion of words standing for some literal meaning 
or fixed semantic substance as “semantic autonomy” (1989:111).  As they discuss ways 
of understanding through metaphor, Lakoff and Turner (1989) point out how the notion 
of literal meaning obscures how we actually derive meaning based on our own 
involvement with the text. If semantic autonomy were actually in play here, where the 
words in the text represented objective realities, then those objective realities should 
have been apparent to Michelle the first time that she read them. 
Addressing issues of variable meaning, Lakoff and Turner (1989) represent how 
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semantic concepts work in our minds through cognitive models made of “schemas,” 
which they define as “knowledge structured in a skeletal form” (1989:61). In conceptual 
metaphor theory, schemas represent how information is classified, stored, and recalled 
in our cognitive structures: “Schemas organize our knowledge. They constitute 
cognitive models of some aspect of the world, models that we use in comprehending 
our experience and in reasoning about it” (1989:65). The information in a particular 
schema corresponds to patterns of inferences related to a concept, and these inferences 
reside within areas called conceptual domains (1989:3). The conceptual domain 
represents the entire area of knowledge we have on that concept. Because a domain 
represents an individual’s understanding of a concept, that domain and its resident 
schemas are activated when the individual accesses the concept. Lakoff and Turner 
(1989) discuss how our schemas are populated with features or elements, which they 
call slots. In cases of variable meaning, those slots (and, therefore, schemas) change 
according to our changing knowledge of a concept (1989:61). For example, if I find out 
more about a certain concept or if my understanding of that concept is challenged, then 
the schema for that concept can be reconfigured according to the new information I 
have acquired. Because schemas are the basic knowledge structures in conceptual 
metaphor theory, they are cognitive tools that we use for understanding metaphors. In 
a process called “mapping” (Lakoff and Turner 1989:4) we recruit a schema from one 
domain (the source) into another domain (the target) so that we can use the pattern of 
inferences from the source to make new sense of the target (1989:62).  
 
 
5  From Conceptual Metaphors to Conceptual Blending Theory  
  
Throughout Michelle’s story, she repeatedly uses variants of a predestination concept 
that posits a God (or a Higher Power) having already planned our destinies before we 
ever fulfill them. Specifically, the AA text casts God in such agentive roles as Director, 
Employer, Principal, Great Physician, and even Creative Intelligence (Alcoholics 
Anonymous 2001:62, 63, 62, 351, 12, 46, 49, respectively). This list is not exhaustive, but 
it does include those agency roles that specify an anthropomorphized Higher Power as 
an agent : “...who is executing the “life plan” of the recovering alcoholic.”That 
recovering alcoholic then moves into the role of the patient, surrendering her agency 
for sobriety. Appearing throughout the AA text as a recurring theme used to describe 
the AA way of life, it acts a “megametaphor” which Stockwell (2002:111) defines as a 
conceptual metaphor that occurs above the sentence level and in varied forms and 
extensions. An example of one of Michelle’s references to “God’s plan” surfaces when 
she shares about finding out that she was pregnant at 16: 
I thought my life was over. But, in hindsight, I know that it was part of God’s plan. Absolutely, 
in the end, I think it pretty much kept me alive. Because that was one of the reasons that I didn’t 
go out drinking every night of the week. Once I had my little girl…Whenever I found out I was 
pregnant, I stopped drinking and I stopped doing drugs. I had my daughter and then, after I had 
her, I kind of wanted to stay away from doing the drugs and alcohol.  
 
In this passage, Michelle’s conceptualization of a God who has a plan for her life 
did not occur until she adopted the AA ideology, which was eight years after she found 
out she was pregnant. So, in this part of her story, she is using the metaphor from the 
AA text to make sense of events that happened nearly a decade before she came to the 
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AA program.  
Michelle actually makes direct reference to the AA text (again as the “Big Book”) 
several times in her story, using it as the authoritative source for her AA-conceived 
autobiography. Citing the GOD IS DIRECTOR and PEOPLE ARE ACTORS metaphors 
from the AA text, she mentions that specific reference in relation to the major romantic 
relationship in her story: 
So, as the relationship continued on, it just got to be too much. The more that I would try to 
control him, the more he would revolt. And it talks about that in our Big Book, you know that 
we try to be nice, and we try to…like the actor and we try to direct the show. And I would try to 
be nice, and I would bend my morals and do things that I didn’t want to do to try to please him 
and make him love me.  (Michelle C. 2009:6) 
 
Above, she uses the concept as a tool for understanding her behavior in that 
relationship and how she was attempting to control the relationship and “direct the 
show” herself. In the AA text, the authors are making use of a the highly 
conventionalized conceptual metaphor, LIFE IS A PLAY, and the text specifies 
God/Higher Power as the agent, the alcoholic as the patient, and even God’s plan or 
script as the instrument (see also Lakoff and Johnson 1989:20). To better understand the 
cognitive work of conceptual metaphors and the role of schemas, Stockwell’s discussion 
of cognitive models is again useful: 
They [cognitive models] can consist of image schemas and propositional structure by relating 
certain elements to others, and they can be enriched or reconfigured by the action of conceptual 
metaphor or metonymy.  (2002:33) 
 
The cognitive models Michelle is using come from the AA text’s directions on 
mapping the conventional concept of a play over the events of her life. The metaphor 
appears in the text as an extended explanation of how a recovering alcoholic can go 
about taking the action of step three (turning her will and her life over to the care of 
God): 
The first requirement is that we be convinced that any life run on self-will can hardly be a 
success…Most people try to live by self-propulsion. Each person is like an actor who wants to 
run the whole show; is forever trying to arrange the lights, the ballet, the scenery and the rest of 
the players in his own way. If his arrangements would only stay put, if only people would do as 
he wished, the show would be great.  (2001:61) 
 
The metaphor reappears on the next page as the authors tell us that, as 
alcoholics in recovery, they “had to quit playing God” and “that hereafter in this drama 
of life, God was going  to be our Director” (2001:62). Six pages later, the metaphor is 
echoed: “We are in the world to play the role He assigns” (2001:68). Again, this list is 
not exhaustive. 
In Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner’s blending theory (2002), this metaphor 
from the AA text is called a blend of the two concepts involved, and this blend is a 
result of a conceptual integration network. These networks consist of mental spaces, 
which Fauconnier and Turner define as “small conceptual packets constructed as we 
think and talk for purposes of local understanding and action” (2002:40). In our 
cognitive structures, mental spaces represent sets of activated neurons, and the 
connections between mental spaces represent the co-activation bindings taking place in 
our minds as we make use of a blend. These connections between co-activated spaces, 
then, are called cross-space mappings. 
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Building on some of the principles of conceptual metaphor theory, conceptual 
blending theory expands the discussion of metaphor to an on-line process which also 
draws on our conceptual domains stored in long-term memory. This on-line process 
represents how metaphorical understanding works in our short-term memory, so it 
accounts for novel and creative uses of existing metaphors. Whereas conceptual 
metaphor theory entails a process of directly mapping structure from a source to a 
target domain, blending theory attempts to account for the multiple unconscious 
mechanisms involved in the process. These mechanisms still enable us to use the 
structure of one domain to understand the information in another domain, but this 
process happens via the use of temporary mental spaces we create “on the fly” 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2002:49) to be able understand a concept in a new way. In a 
blend, there are at least four mental spaces: 1) input space 1, 2) input space 2, 3) generic 
space, 4) blended space. (There may be more than two input spaces in a blend, but only 
two are necessary for a blend to occur.) The two input spaces supply the blend with our 
existing knowledge from the different domains. The information in the input spaces 
(and all of the mental spaces) is connected to existing knowledge of two types: 
schematic knowledge and specific knowledge. Fauconnier and Turner (2002:40) use the 
term “frames” to describe the schematic knowledge which is recruited from long-term 
memory to input space 1, like existing patterns of inferences on how a play is 
conducted. Frames of meaning here would include, for example, the script, the 
stage/setting, the role of the actors, and the role of the director. Input space 2 would 
recruit specific knowledge from long-term memory, like specific memories of personal 
actions and outcomes in past experience. Counterpart connections are then made 
between the two inputs.  
As a conventionalized metaphor, LIFE IS A PLAY (Table 1) includes some 
counterpart connections that we can anticipate before looking specifically at how the 
metaphor is working in the blend: 
 
PLAY        LIFE 
Actor Person living life 
Stage/Setting Person’s environment 
Other actors Other people 
 
Table 1. Counterpart connections in LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor 
 
 
In addition to the cross-space mapping of counterparts, whatever structural 
elements the two input spaces seem to have in common are projected to create the 
elements of the generic space. These generic structural elements are then mapped back 
onto the counterpart connections from each of the inputs (Fauconnier and Turner 
2002). These connections and their accompanying structural elements are projected into 
the blended space where the integration of the newly emergent knowledge or material 
is integrated. The blending diagram below (Figure 1) shows the mental spaces and the 
newly emergent material which results from the conceptual integration network. 
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Figure 1. The blend within the conceptual integration network 
 
Generic Space 
 
Agent.  
 
Patient. 
 
Instrument. 
 
Goal. 
 
Blend 
Director is agent. 
Michelle is 
actor/patient. 
Director’s work is to 
write the script for her 
life. 
Events in her life are 
meaningful as they are 
in director’s script. 
 
Input 1 (Play) 
Director. 
Actor.             
Script. 
Stage/Setting. 
Events in play are 
meaningful narrative. 
Other actors. 
Input 2 (Life) 
 
Michelle. 
Self will. 
Michelle’s environment. 
Events in Michelle’s life 
are random. 
Other people in 
Michelle’s life. 
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Not surprisingly, the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor and variations on this theme 
appear as a megametaphor in Michelle’s story, too. Fauconnier and Turner (2002:49) 
discuss the process of “entrenchment” in blending theory whereby blends, mappings, 
and frames also become commonly used conceptual models within a community like 
they are recurring here. In the following excerpt, Michelle makes use of the metaphor 
again when she finally decides to ask a friend for help with her addictions: 
And I went to her house. And…Hindsight…And this is how God works. She—which I didn’t 
know at the time—she was an R.N. I knew she was a nurse, but she had worked at a treatment 
facility before in Baton Rouge a few years before and so had some experience with detoxing 
patients and the whole…getting into AA, going to meetings, and doing that sort of thing. So that 
really, really helped me, and I know that that was just part of God’s plan.  
 
Not only does Michelle mention God’s plan again, but she also mentions “how 
God works.” According to the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor, God’s work would be that of 
either the playwright (the one who writes the script/plan) or that of the director. As 
Michelle continues recounting that day, she tells me how she asked God for “direction:” 
And I remember, before I went to her house, I kind of basically told God, “Ok, God, I need some 
direction because I don’t know what to do.” And I thought throughout that…I would see little 
things that basically just led me to her house. And so I told her everything, and that’s how I 
started going to meetings.  
 
Even though Michelle describes asking God for direction before she was ever 
exposed to the AA text’s use of the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor, this use of elements of 
the network shows that she had already been in contact with the metaphor even before 
her exposure to it from the AA text. While the AA text very specifically defines God as 
the “director” of the recovering alcoholic’s life, the metaphor she is drawing on is one 
that has been deeply entrenched as a conventional metaphor already. As mentioned 
above, the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor has been around for thousands of years, having 
been applied in conjunction with the concept of predestination. What is so significant 
about this metaphor as it appears in Michelle’s story is its frequency and its ideological 
dominance as she continues to rely on it to make sense of her life and to create her 
identity in the past, present, and future. When she was disconnected from the text in 
her early exposure, she was unable to conceive of herself in any way that would merge 
with the AA system. Without conceiving of herself as a part of the AA system, she 
could not conceive of the system as any part of herself.  In this case, the language in the 
text did not offer an objective meaning; she had to create semantic constructs from the 
AA ideology before she could interpret the concepts that she later came to believe. Her 
new understanding of the AA ideology, in turn, allowed her to conceive of the language 
in the text differently from how she had understood it in previous exposures. Certainly, 
the words in the text did not change. This section of the text, now in its fourth edition, 
has remained basically unchanged since the 1939 publication of the first edition. What 
did change was her relationship to the language in the text when the community taught 
her how to become a speaker of their language. 
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